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This paper considers the question ‘How should institutions enable people to meet their 
needs  in  situations  where  there  is  no  guarantee  that  all  needs  can  be  met?’  After 
considering and rejecting several simple principles for meeting needs, it suggests a new 
effectiveness principle that 1) gives greater weight to the needs of the less well off and 2) 
gives  weight  to  enabling  a  greater  number  of  people  to  meet  their  needs.  The 
effectiveness  principle  has  some  advantage  over  the  main  competitors  including  a 
principle suggested by David Miller in Principles of Social Justice. Miller argues that his 
principle accounts for the existing data on individuals’ intuitions about meeting needs. 
The effectiveness principle better accounts for this data. Furthermore, this paper presents 
a  new  experiment  on  intuitions  about  meeting  need  that  is  consistent  with  the 
effectiveness principle but not Miller’s principle.
1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you work for an aid agency helping people secure vitamin supplements from 
the  limited  stock  available.  Suppose  that  you  have  to  choose  how  to  distribute  20 
milligrams of vitamin among four people to help them avoid risk of illness caused by 
vitamin-deprivation. If a person does not end up with a total of 20 milligrams that person 
will have some risk of serious illness. Suppose you know that the more milligrams a 
person  has  the  less  likely  that  person  is  to  get  sick  and  that  having  even  a  single 
milligram will lower a person’s risk of disease. You are also able to figure out how much 
vitamin each person is already receiving. So, after doing a few calculations, you create 
the diagram below illustrating how many milligrams each person already has and needs.
   18 12 6 0
Each rectangle represents a person. The dotted line denotes the level at which people can 
meet their needs -- the needs threshold. The height of each rectangle shows how close a 
person comes to being able to meet their needs. The first person has 18 milligrams, so 
needs two milligrams to get enough vitamin. The second person has 12 milligrams, so 
needs eight milligrams to get enough vitamin. The third person has six milligrams, so 
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needs 14 milligrams to get enough vitamin. The last person has no vitamin, so needs 20 
milligrams to get enough vitamin. What should you do if you cannot enable everyone to 
meet their needs?
There are many things you might take into account in deciding what to do. You 
might, for instance, try to maximize efficiency in helping people meet needs, help all 
equally, or aid the least well off. In the example above, for instance, it might be most 
efficient to help whomever you come across first. You might help all equally by helping 
each person secure an equal amount of vitamin. You might aid the least well off by using 
all available vitamins to help the person who needs 20 milligrams. 
In different contexts, such principles might suggest different courses of action. In 
some situations, they might lead institutions (and those in institutional roles) to prioritize 
emergency  aid  over  long  term  development  assistance,  health  interventions  over 
agricultural support, or education over shelter. Alternately, these or other principles might 
lead  institutions  to  conditionalize  aid  to  countries  on  their  adopting  good  economic 
policies or to aid individuals on the basis of how many disability adjusted life years they 
can secure. 
This  paper  considers  the  question  ‘How  should  institutions  (and  those  in 
institutional  roles)  enable  people  to  meet  their  needs  in  situations  where  there  is  no 
guarantee that all needs can be met?’ It starts by considering several simple principles for 
enabling people to meet needs set out in David Miller’s Principles of Social Justice. Like 
Miller,  it  rejects  these simple  principles.  But,  this  inquiry helps  justify an alternative 
principle that 1) gives greater weight to the needs of the less well off and 2) gives weight 
to enabling a greater number of people to meet their needs. This effectiveness principle 
does not provide an account of the appropriate balance between these two objectives. Nor 
does it explain how institutions might address conflicts between enabling people to meet 
their  needs  and other  significant  moral  imperatives.  The effectiveness  principle  does, 
however, provide some practical guidance. Furthermore, it has some advantages over the 
main competitors including a principle Miller advances. Miller argues that his principle 
accounts  for  the  existing  data  on  individuals’  intuitions  about  meeting  needs.  The 
effectiveness  principle  better  accounts  for  this  data.  This  paper  also  presents  a  new 
experiment on intuitions about meeting need. This experiment shows that people do not 
accept any of the traditional principles for meeting needs including Miller’s principle. 
The  new  data  suggests,  however,  that  many  people  accept  something  like  the 
effectiveness principle. Let us start by considering a few preliminaries.
2. PRELIMINARIES
This paper does not distinguish between the different things people might need. People 
might, for instance, need resources, opportunities, whatever fulfills their preferences, or 
welfare. Rather, it talks generally about units of necessary goods and corresponding units  
of need. One might, for instance, define units of needs (and necessary goods) using a 
metric on the ability to secure some minimal amount of welfare. If one US dollar a day or 
3,000 calories a week allowed a person to secure an equal amount of welfare one might, 
then, specify that one US dollar and 3,000 calories are equivalent to one unit of necessary 
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good for that person. So, if that person needed two US dollars a day or 6,000 calories a 
week, she would have two units of need. 
Individuals vary in their ability to make use of necessary goods because of factors 
like age, sex, and health status. Institutions should take these differences in ability into 
account. Setting these qualifications aside, this paper supposes that a given quantity of 
necessary goods will  alleviate  an approximately equal  amount  of  need for all  people 
(assuming that people start out with similar needs). This assumption allows a metric on 
needs and necessary goods to be quite general. Both necessary goods and individuals’ 
needs  become commensurable.  So,  suppose  institutions  are  concerned to  help  people 
secure food, money, and educational opportunities. They will know how much need is 
satisfied by helping someone secure a particular quantity of food vs. enabling another to 
secure a particular educational opportunity or amount of money. It might, for instance, be 
just as good to enable 10 children to attend high school as to enable a single child to 
secure food and water for a year. 
The Proportionality Principle
Keeping the above preliminaries in mind, consider one simple principle institutions might 
use for fulfilling need -- the proportionality principle. The proportionality principle tells 
institutions to help individuals in proportion to their need. Suppose that an institution is 
trying to enable two people -- Tamil and Effe -- to meet their needs. Tamil has one unit of 
need. Effe has 1.5 units of need. According to the proportionality principle, the institution 
should enable  Effe to  secure 1.5 times the  amount  it  enables  Tamil  to  secure.  If  the 
institution has one unit to distribute, it would enable Tamil to secure enough resources to 
alleviate .4 units of her need and Effe to secure enough resources to alleviate .6 units of 
her need. The ratio .4:.6 is 1:1.5. This distribution helps Tamil and Effe secure necessary 
goods in proportion to their need. 
To make this concrete, suppose that Tamil needs an extra bag of rice every week 
and  Effe needs  a  bag  and  a  half.  Suppose  there  is  one  bag  to  distribute.  The 
proportionality principle tells institutions to help Tamil secure two-fifths of the bag and 
Effe to secure three-fifths. This distribution would be in proportion to need since 2/5:3/5 
is .4:.6 or 1:1.5. 
Miller believes that that the proportionality principle does not give enough weight 
to Effe’s greater need. He believes that the needs of the less well off merit greater than 
proportional weight. Let us call any principle that gives more than proportional weight to 
the needs of the less well off  progressive.  Miller does not offer an explicit justification 
for  adopting  a  progressive  principle  over  the  proportionality  principle.  He  might, 
however, object to the proportionality principle because he is concerned about equalizing 
unmet  need.  He  might  think  that  the  following  consequence  of  the  proportionality 
principle is problematic. If necessary goods are always used to help people in proportion 
to their need, the least well off will always need more than the better off until everyone’s 
needs are met; there will be always be inequality in remaining needs. Miller’s problem 
with the proportionality principle may be that it does not help equalize unmet need. 
I will argue below that a concern for equality in meeting needs is misplaced; this 
concern leads Miller awry.  Unfortunately,  I do not know of any defensible reason to 
prefer the progressive principle Miller favors to the proportionality principle. Both the 
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progressive principle and the proportionality principles are, however, in the subcategory 
of prioritarian principles and it is possible to make a case for a prioritarian principle.
A prioritarian  principle gives greater weight to helping the less well off than it 
gives to helping the better off. It is possible to defend a prioritarian principle as follows. 
Consider this psychological fact: Normally, a given quantity of goods brings more utility 
to a person who has less of those goods than to one who has more of those goods. i This 
observation  holds  even  for  those  in  need.  People  generally  prefer  to  have  a  unit  of 
necessary good more when they have less of that good than when they have more of that 
good. On a subjective theory of need (on which people’s needs are determined solely by 
reference to their subjective states) we might say more need is fulfilled by enabling the 
less  well  off  to  secure  necessary goods.ii Furthermore,  one might  argue  that  the best 
explanation of why people generally prefer to have a unit of necessary good more when 
they have less of that good than when they have more of that good is this: Giving a 
person a unit of necessary good usually satisfies more objective need when that person 
has less of that good. So, even on an objective theory of need (on which people’s needs 
are not determined solely by reference to their subjective states), it is plausible that more 
need is fulfilled by helping the less well off secure necessary goods. 
Even if  preferences  do not generally track the goodness of fulfilling objective 
need, the following conclusion is independently plausible: It is often better to enable the 
less  well  off  to  secure  necessary  goods  than  to  enable  the  better  off  do  so.  This  is 
plausible even if everyone has unmet needs (on an objective need theory). To see why, 
suppose that an institution must distribute water to those who live in a land ravaged by 
drought. Everyone has an objective need for a few liters of water every week. Suppose an 
institution had a liter to distribute and could either help someone who has already had a 
liter or to someone who has not had any. What should it do? Unless people need two 
liters  to survive it  is  better  to help someone who has not had any.  Barring threshold 
effects it is, normally, better to give more weight to alleviating the needs of the less well 
off.iii 
Exactly  how much  weight  greater  needs  should get  is  an  open question.  The 
above argument suggests, normally, giving enough weight to those with greater needs to 
compensate for the effects of declining marginal need-satisfaction. The marginal need-
satisfaction of a resource for a person is the difference an additional unit of necessary 
goods  will  make  to  how much  need  a  person has.  So  saying  that  there  is  declining 
marginal need satisfaction means this: The marginal need satisfaction a person gets from 
a unit of necessary good declines the more units of necessary good the person already 
has. 
Sometimes, however, institutions may be justified in giving even more weight to 
helping the less well off than the amount that would maximize need fulfillment (taking 
declining  marginal  need  satisfaction  into  account).  Suppose,  for  instance,  that  an 
institution  has  to  decide  whether  to  help  a  sick  child  secure  some  pain  relieving 
medication or help a healthy child secure better nutrition. Suppose further that both of 
these  actions  are  equally  good  with  respect  to  need  fulfillment.  Which  should  the 
institution do? In informal surveys, I have found that people believe that the institution 
should aid the sick child. Perhaps it is even better to help the less well off than it appears 
to be given the effects of declining marginal need-fulfillment.iv So institutions may be 




The  version  of  the  progressive  principle  Miller  considers  after  rejecting  the 
proportionality principle gives absolute priority to meeting the needs of the least well-off. 
Only when everyone needs an equal amount does this strict  priority principle  require 
helping everyone. Suppose, again, that Effe has 1.5 units of need and Tamil has one unit 
of need. The strict priority principle tells institutions to distribute goods to Effe until she 
is no longer the least well off. Only when Effe and Tamil both need one unit is it okay to 
split the rest between them equally. 
Again, to make this concrete, suppose an institution is distributing rice. Suppose, 
once more, that there is one bag of rice to distribute. Effe needs 1.5 bags and Tamil needs 
one bag. In this case, the institution should help Effe secure one-half a bag and then split 
the rest between the two. Effe gets three-fourths of a bag and Tamil gets one-quarter of a 
bag. They are both left needing three-quarters of a bag. 
Unfortunately, the strict priority principle is implausible. There are two reasons 
for  this.  First,  the  evidence  marshaled  in  support  of  a  prioritarian  principle  does  not 
recommend a strict prioritarian principle. At most, it supports a moderately progressive 
prioritarian principle that gives less weight to the needs of the least well off than the strict 
priority principle.v Recall the intuitions described above in favor of prioritarianism. If an 
institution  has  to  decide  whether  to  help  a  sick  child  secure  some  pain  relieving 
medication or a healthy child secure better nutrition, most people think it should aid the 
sick one even if both of these actions are equally good with respect to need fulfillment.  
Most  people,  however,  are  a  bit  ambivalent  on  the  point.  They  do  not  think  that 
institutions should aid the sick child come what may. The needs of the healthy child have 
some weight and can trump the needs of the sick child at some point even if the sick child 
is never as well off as the healthy one.
Furthermore, on the strict priority principle, it is not acceptable to fulfill the needs 
of anyone who is not at least tied for the position of least well  off.vi In many situations 
this  is  unreasonable.  In  times  of  disaster,  for  instance,  the  policy  of  triage  may  be 
justified. Triage requires helping those who have great needs but not those who need the 
most first (even if the neediest could be helped). 
Triage is compatible with giving more weight to greater needs. Sometimes, even 
taking into account the greater needs of the least well off, it is better to help those who 
are not least well-off. There are at least two cases in which triage might be justified. 
First,  triage may alleviate a greater amount of weighted need than helping the 
least well off alleviates. Due to institutional constraints, for instance, there may be no 
way to alleviate as much weighted need by helping the least well off. Suppose that there 
are 12 people in need. One person has two units of need; the others have only one unit of  
need each. There are two options. First, an institution might help the least well off person 
secure one unit of necessary good. Alternately, it might help the other 11 people secure 
one unit of necessary good each. Perhaps it is so costly to help the least well off person 
that it is impossible to help the least well off and the others as well. It might be the case  
that more weighted need is alleviated if the institution helps 11 people on a prioritarian 
principle. This is so if, for instance, the weight given to fulfilling a unit of need for a 
person equals  the  number  of  units  the  person needs  before  receiving  the  unit.  Then, 
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helping the person who needs 10 units secure one unit yields a ‘score’ of 10. Helping the 
other 11 people secure one unit each yields a score of 11 (1*1 for each person). Helping 
the 11 yields a higher score; doing so alleviates more weighted need than helping the 
least  well off. This is so even though alleviating a unit of need for the least well off 
person is 10 times as good as alleviating a unit of need for any of the other people. But 
even if one does not believe that this weighting schema gives enough weight to the least 
well off, all weighting schemas will support triage in some cases. Sometimes institutions 
can help 1,000 or even 1,000,000 with the resources they would otherwise use to help the 
least well off. 
Second, triage may be acceptable even if institutions can alleviate an equal (or 
even greater) amount of weighted need by helping the least well off. Intuitively, it may be 
best not to help the least well off even when the greatest amount of weighted need will be 
alleviated by doing so. This does not mean that the greater needs of the least well off are 
not given sufficient weight. It just means that fulfilling the greatest amount of weighted 
need is not all that matters. If institutions can help a much greater number by ignoring the 
needs of the least well off, it may sometimes be acceptable for them to help the better off 
even though they can alleviate more need by helping the worse-off.
The prioritarian does not share this intuition. She believes it is only better to help 
a greater number of people than to help the least well off when this alleviates the most 
weighted  need.  There  are  two  ways  the  prioritarian  may  object  to  any  case  that  is 
supposed to  show that  triage  can  be  acceptable  when  it  does  not  alleviate  the  most 
weighted need. First, she may object to the weighting schema used in the case because 
she thinks it gives too much weight to helping the less well off. Second, she may accept 
the weighting schema but deny the intuition that triage is acceptable in the case. 
It  is,  thus,  easier  to  show that  prioritarianism is  unintuitive  if  the  prioritarian 
agrees to some particular weighting schema first (it does not matter which one). We can 
then show that this weighting schema will, in some cases, lead to quite unintuitive results; 
any weighting schema will suggest that an arbitrarily large number of the better off’s 
(arbitrarily large) needs should, in some cases, be ignored to help the least well off. Let 
us suppose then that the prioritarian thinks that institutions should distribute in proportion 
to need weighting the amount given to alleviating a unit of each person’s need by the 
amount  that  person starts  off  needing as described above. The means of constructing 
counter examples to prioritarianism based on triage will become clear via the examples 
below. 
To  motivate  the  weighting  schema  described  above  consider  a  simple  case: 
Suppose that we must choose how to distribute two units of necessary good between 10 
people.  Suppose that Tamil  is  the worst-off and needs three units  of necessary good, 
while the other people only need one unit each. In this case, alleviating the first unit of 
Tamil’s need yields a score of three, alleviating the second unit of Tamil’s need yields a 
score  of  two,  and  alleviating  the  last  unit  of  Tamil’s  need  yields  a  score  of  one. 
Alleviating a unit of any other person’s need yields a score of one. So, it is just as good to 
alleviate one unit of Tamil’s need as to alleviate three others’ needs. It is just as good to 
alleviate  all  of Tamil’s  need as it  is to alleviate six others’ needs. Enabling Tamil  to 
secure a single unit would be better than helping two other people secure a single unit 
each.  Supposing the  prioritarian  finds  this  intuitive  enough,  we can  show that  it  has 
unintuitive consequences in some cases. This weighting schema might suggest that an 
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arbitrarily large number of the better off’s (arbitrarily large) needs should be ignored to 
help the least well off. Consider the following example. Suppose that an institution must 
choose how to distribute 100 units of necessary good between 200 people. Suppose that 
Tamil is the worst-off and needs 100 units of necessary good, the other people only need 
one unit. Weighting the amount given to each person by that person’s need would tell us 
that alleviating the first unit of Tamil’s need is 100 times as good as alleviating any other 
person’s need (100*1 = 100(1*1)). Similarly, alleviating the second unit of Tamil’s need 
would be 99 times as good as alleviating any other person’s need. Helping Tamil secure a 
single unit, however, would be better than helping 99 other people secure a single unit 
each.  If the prioritarian does not think this  is unintuitive,  we can create similar  cases 
where this weighting schema suggests neglecting the needs of thousands or millions to 
help a single poorly-off person. Simply by multiplying the needs in the example above by 
any constant  we  can  also  make  the  amount  that  the  better  off  need  in  the  example 
arbitrarily large. Triage is sometimes required even when it does not alleviate the greatest 
amount of weighted need.
Perhaps the prioritarian could respond that this weighting schema gives too much 
weight to the needs of the least well off; she might think that the needs of each should be 
weighted by only a fraction of their need. Such alternative weighting schemas, however, 
will lead to equally unintuitive cases. (I leave it to the skeptical reader to experiment with 
constructing such cases along the lines above.) In fact, I can think of no straight-forward 
weighting schema that is not subject to such counter-examples where, intuitively,  it is 
better to meet the needs of a greater number than to maximize the amount of weighted 
need fulfillment.
So far we have adopted the simplifying assumption that a unit of necessary good 
fulfills an approximately equal amount of need for all people (assuming that these people 
start  out  with  similar  needs).  The  intuition  that  triage  is  sometimes  required  is 
strengthened, however, if some people are inefficient users of necessary goods. Suppose, 
for instance, an institution must decide how to distribute 100 units of necessary goods 
between a hundred people. Suppose that one person needs 10 units and the other 99 need 
five units each. It might seem reasonable to help everyone just a little but to help the least 
well off secure more. Suppose we specify, however, that to alleviate one unit of need for 
the least well it would take 100 units of necessary goods while one unit of necessary good 
will alleviate one unit of need for someone who is better off. It, then, seems much more 
reasonable to help only the better off. 
Triage might be justified in many ways. A good justification will leave open the 
possibility that triage may be justified even if it does not alleviate the greatest amount of 
weighted needs. The principle I prefer is this: Institutions should try to help  as many 
people as possible meet their needs.vii In some situations a concern for helping as many 
people as possible may outweigh a concern to help the least well off. 
The principle that institutions should try to help as many people as possible meet 
their needs expresses a concern for persons. Institutions should try to help people meet 
their  needs  because  people merit  respect  as  separate  individuals.viii If  persons  matter, 
institutions should not just be concerned about fulfilling as much need as possible; they 
should be concerned about helping each person. The fact that some have greater needs 
cannot always trump the fact that there are others in need. 
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Finally, the fact that the case for triage is stronger where many people have dire 
needs supports the principle that institutions should try to help as many people as possible 
meet their needs.ix It is usually less justifiable to help the least well off when doing so 
prevents  an  institution  from  helping  100  people  than  when  doing  so  prevents  an 
institution from helping 10 people.  Ceteris  paribus,  institutions  should try to help  as 
many people as possible meet their needs. 
There are other principles that might explain why triage is justifiable. It may, for 
instance,  only be better  to  help  a  greater  number  of  people  in  emergency situations. 
Alternately,  helping the greater number may have declining marginal importance. The 
alternatives are implausible. Even when there is not an emergency, triage may sometimes 
be required. At least the examples we gave above to motivate these kinds of decisions did 
not mention emergencies.  Futhermore,  it  is not clear why helping the greater number 
would have declining marginal importance. At least, the principle that each person merits 
respect as a separate individual tells against this view. 
3. EFFECTIVENESS
If the previous section’s arguments are correct, a good principle for meeting need should 
judge policies by their performance on two criteria. First, how many people they help. 
Second, their efficacy in alleviating weighted need where more (finite) weight is given to 
fulfilling the needs of those who are worse-off.x Let us call the principle that embodies 
these criteria the effectiveness principle. On this principle, a situation is, ceteris paribus, 
better if it contains less weighted need or helps more people. 
To  apply  the  effectiveness  principle,  institutions  might  follow this  procedure: 
First, rank the possible policies from best to worst according to how much weighted need 
they alleviate.  Second, rank the possible policies from best to worst  according to the 
number of people they help. Third, for each policy, combine its ranking in terms of how 
much weighted need it alleviates with its ranking for how many people it helps to yield 
its final score.xi Choose fairly between those policies that have the largest score.xii 
Consider how the effectiveness principle will work in the simplest  case where 
each part of the principle has the same implication. Suppose that there are two equally 
needy people. Suppose that an institution can either help one person secure two units of 
some good or help each secure one unit. Helping each secure one unit helps as many 
people as possible. Because the people are equally poor, it is better to alleviate the first 
unit of a person’s need than to alleviate the second unit. So, helping each person secure 
one unit of necessary goods also alleviates the most weighted need. The effectiveness 
principle, thus, suggests helping each secure one unit. 
Now consider  a  simple  case  where tradeoffs  may need to  be made.  Suppose, 
again, that there are two needy people and that an institution must choose whether to help 
one  person  secure  two  units  of  necessary  good  or  to  help  both  secure  one  unit  of 
necessary good. Suppose, however, that one person needs more than the other. In such 
hard cases, a concern for helping as many people as possible is weighed against a concern 
for alleviating the most weighted need possible.  What the effectiveness principle will 
suggest depends on the relative importance of the two parts of the principle. If it is better 
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to help the least well off than to help both people, the effectiveness principle will tell 
institutions to help the less well off; otherwise it will suggest helping both.
We have not specified how much weight each part of the effectiveness principle 
has. So, one may worry about whether we have made much progress in deciding how to 
fulfill need. Perhaps the principle provides no practical or theoretical guidance. Perhaps it 
provides no real advantage over the main competitors.
This  worry  is  not  well-founded.  The  effectiveness  principle  has  some  policy 
implications. Consider how institutions might use the effectiveness principle to evaluate 
actual  policies.  Development agencies  like Oxfam and the World Bank try to reduce 
poverty. They have limited resources. Sometimes such programs only try to maximize the 
number of people helped without taking into account the greater importance of meeting 
the needs of the least well off.  In such cases, the effectiveness principle will probably 
suggest altering the programs so that they fulfill more weighted need. It is important to 
try to help as many people as possible.  It is also important to give enough weight to  
helping those who are worse-off. 
Or consider what the effectiveness principle  says  in another realistic  example. 
Suppose an institution  has  a  limited  budget  for  helping people in  a  particular  region 
secure  either  vitamin  A  or  vitamin  D,  or  both.  Vitamin  A  deficiency  results  from 
malnutrition which, we can suppose, only affects the least well off. Vitamin D can be 
absorbed from the sun. Suppose that the least well off happen to be farmers who work 
outside and so have enough vitamin D. Suppose that helping the least well off secure 
vitamin A maximizes the amount  of weighted need the institution alleviates.  Suppose 
helping the relatively better off secure vitamin D helps a greater number of people meet 
their  needs  but  does  not  help  the least  well  off.  The effectiveness  principle  tells  the 
institution to help some people secure vitamin A and some secure vitamin D. After all, 
institutions must give some weight to meeting more weighted need and some to helping a 
greater  number  of  people.  Depending  on  the  relative  weights  of  the  considerations, 
however, different versions of the principle will tell the institution to help people secure 
more of one vitamin than the other. 
We  can  also  eliminate  some  justifications  for  particular  policies  using  the 
effectiveness principle.  If, for instance, one believes that free trade is the best way to 
enable people to meet their needs, one cannot say that this is because the free market will  
most efficiently fulfill need, that it will help all meet their needs equally, or that it will  
fulfill the most need for the least well off group. One must argue that the free market 
strikes an appropriate balance between fulfilling the most weighted need possible and 
helping the greatest number of people meet their needs. 
It would be nice if it were possible to say more about how to resolve conflicts 
between the two parts of the effectiveness principle. One way of doing so is to figure out 
what  kinds  of  principles  well  informed  and  appropriately  impartial  people  (perhaps 
placed in something like an original position) would accept.xiii This paper will say a bit 
more about how this project might be carried out below. It might, however, be impossible 
to say much that is plausible about this issue at a completely general level. Furthermore, 
the absence of a complete account may not be problematic. We cannot ignore the need 
for judgment and sensitivity to changing contexts. A little humility may be better than a 
lot of precision. 
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So far, we have shown that the effectiveness principle has some advantages over 
competing principles including those that suggest maximizing need fulfillment, fulfilling 
everyone’s  needs  equally,  the  difference  principle,  the  prioritarian  principle,  and  the 
proportionality principle. None of these competing principles both give more weight to 
the needs of the less well off and give weight to helping a greater number of people. On 
the effectiveness principle it is good to try to help as many people as possible meet their  
needs.xiv It is also good to give more weight to the needs of those who are worse-off. So, 
the effectiveness principle gives more weight to the needs of the less well off and allows 
triage in some cases. 
There are, however, other competing principles. In what follows we will, thus, 
consider one of these competitors – David Miller’s principle for need fulfillment. This 
inquiry is important because Miller’s principle is the only alternative to the effectiveness 
principle that I am aware of designed explicitly as a principle of need satisfaction. It is 
also  the  strongest  remaining  competitor.  So,  if  the  problems  with  Miller’s  principle 
cannot  be overcome and the effectiveness principle  can avoid them, the effectiveness 
principle should be, tentatively, accepted. 
4. MILLER’S PRINCIPLE
Like the effectiveness principle,  Miller’s principle  avoids the problems with the strict 
priority and proportionality principles.  Miller believes,  however, that a good principle 
should  embody  a  commitment  to  equality  in  meeting  needs.  He  rejects  a  principle 
motivated  in  a  similar  way  to  the  effectiveness  principle  because  it  does  not  take 
inequality into account. 
Miller  measures  equality  by  summing  the  gaps  (in  resources,  preference 
satisfaction, opportunities, welfare, or whatever) between each pair of individuals in a 
situation.xv ‘Whichever distribution yields the lowest sum total of difference is judged to 
be the most equal and therefore, in this context, the fairest.’xvi Miller then adds the total 
amount of remaining need to this inequality to give a score for need improvement. Lower 
scores indicate less remaining need and/or inequality – they are better. If we assume, with 
Miller,  that  institutions  have  reason  to  bring  about  situations  with  lower  scores,  his 
principle tells institutions how to fulfill needs.
To see how his principle works, consider the following diagram:
A B C D E F G
Recall that each rectangle represents a person. The dotted line denotes the level at which 
people can meet their needs --  the needs threshold. The height of each rectangle shows 
how close a person comes to being able to meet their needs. Suppose that all individuals 
need two units of some necessary goods. Suppose A has two units of need, B, C, D, E 
and F have one unit  of need, and G can meet  her needs.  There is  a gap of one unit 
between A’s level and the level of B-F, a two unit gap between the levels of A and G, and 
a gap of one unit between the level of B-F and the level of G. Adding these gaps together 
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gives us 12 units total inequality. The remaining need is the sum of the amounts by which 
A-F fall below the threshold or, in this case, seven. Hence, Miller’s principle gives this 
situation a score of 19.
5. PROBLEMS WITH MILLER’S PRINCIPLE
Leveling Down
Unfortunately, Miller’s principle has some unintuitive consequences. One problem with 
his principle is that it is subject to the leveling down objection. A principle is subject to 
the leveling down objection if it entails that equality can be increased by lowering some 
people’s welfare, preference satisfaction, opportunities, or resources even if this benefits 
no one. To see how Miller’s principle is subject to the leveling down objection consider 
the situation from above: 
A B C D E F G
Recall  that Miller’s principle gives this  situation a score of 19. Now suppose that an 
institution brings B-G down to A’s level. 
A B C D E  F G
There is no inequality in this situation and seven people each need two units. So, the 
inequality measure of need in this situation is 14. Because 14 is less than 19, bringing B-
G down to A’s level is a good move on Miller’s principle. 
Miller  recognizes  this  unintuitive  consequence  of  his  principle.  He  tries  to 
motivate its acceptance with an example. In a fuel shortage, he says, it may be acceptable  
to throw some fuel away rather than help a few people secure more fuel than the rest.xvii
I  do  not  believe  this  response  will  do.  Miller’s  principle  might  entail  that 
institutions should take necessary goods from the needy or impoverish everyone, even if 
this benefits no one. This is unacceptable. At least, this is unacceptable for an account of 
how institutions should fulfill needs; need cannot be fulfilled by reducing the amount that 
some have when this benefits no one. 
Perhaps because Miller does not really want to bite the bullet on this point, he 
tries to avoid this problem by amending his principle in a few ways.  First, he adds a 
concern for satisfying as many needs as possible to his principle. This may help avoid 
leveling down in some cases. It does not, however, solve the problem in the case above if 
we specify that no more need can be satisfied in the original situation.xviii Maybe because 
he realizes that his first proposal will not allow his principle to avoid the leveling down 
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objection  completely,  Miller  offers  another  proposal.  He  suggests  using  a  theory  of 
equality  that  is  not  subject  to  the  leveling  down objection  in  calculating  inequality. 
Unfortunately, Miller does not provide such a theory nor explain how we might find one. 
A good principle for need fulfillment should not tell institutions that it is good to increase 
the amount some need if this does not decrease the amount others need. I have tried to 
come  up  with  a  theory  that  avoids  leveling  down  using  Larry  Temkin’s  work  in 
Inequality but it is not as easy as Miller supposes to find such a theory.xix Since I cannot 
prove  that  it  is  impossible  for  Miller’s  theory  to  avoid  the  leveling  down problem, 
however, let us consider another problem with Miller’s principle. 
Sensitivity to Irrelevant Factors
Miller’s principle is sensitive to irrelevant factors. Consider an illustration. Once again 
this is the initial situation:
A B C D E F G
Suppose that an institution can either reduce A’s need by one unit or reduce each of B-F’s 
needs by one unit. Action one brings A up to the level of B-F. Action two brings B-F up 
to  G’s  level  but leaves  A at  her  current  level.  If  the institution  does action  one, the 
resulting situation looks like this: 
A B C D E F G
The inequality in this situation is six. The remaining need is six. So, Miller’s principle 
gives this situation a score of 12. If the institution does action two, this is the situation:
A B C D E F G
The inequality here is 12. Remaining need is two. So, the score in this situation is 14. 
Since 14 is greater than 12, Miller’s principle suggests doing action one. When the initial 
situation  is  slightly  modified,  however,  Miller’s  principle  returns  a  different  result. 
Suppose that the initial situation contains extra people H, I, J, and K who are all able to  
meet their needs. This is the initial situation:
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    A B C  D E FG  H I  J  K
There are seven units of need in this situation. There are forty units of inequality. Miller’s 
principle, thus, gives this situation a score of forty-seven. If the institution does action 
one, reducing A’s need by one unit, the resulting situation looks like this:
    A B C D E F G H I  J  K
Inequality is 30. Remaining need is six. So, Miller’s principle gives this situation a score 
of 36. If the institution does action two, this is the result:
     A B C D E F G H I  J  K
Inequality is two. Remaining need is 20. So, the score for this situation is 22. Since 22 is 
less than 36 Miller’s principle requires action two. On Miller’s principle, whose needs 
institutions should meet depends on how many people there are who are already able to  
meet their needs. This is unintuitive. 
Miller recognizes this strange consequence of his principle. Hence, he asserts that 
justice requires considering ‘the relative position of everyone falling within the universe 
of distribution. We should assess not merely the claims of A vis-à-vis B, C, and D, but 
the claims of each of them against  G, H, I,  and so on.’xx Miller believes  that  justice 
requires equality and institutions need to take equality into account in meeting needs. He 
tries to justify this concern for equality before setting out his account. Let us consider 
whether his justification can compensate for the unintuitive consequences of including 
this concern in a principle about how to meet need. If there is no reason to believe a good 
principle for meeting need has to embody a concern for equality, there is reason to accept 
the  effectiveness  principle.  It  avoids  the  problems  we  have  canvassed  for  Miller’s 
principle (see Appendix I) as well as the others we have considered.xxi 
Equality
Miller believes that we should aim for reflective equilibrium in moral theorizing; good 
theories should account for our settled intuitions.xxii He thinks that experimental evidence 
can get at our settled intuitions. He, thus, provides the results of a few experiments to 
show that ‘people will aim to equalize degrees of unmet need, which means distributing 
in favor of those in greater need until they are brought up to the same level as others.’xxiii 
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Though this  paper  will  argue  below that  the experimental  evidence  does  not  support 
Miller’s principle let us first consider Miller’s methodology. 
It is not clear when appealing to intuitions is appropriate in ethical theory. There 
are different views on the matter. Some believe that an author need only account for his 
or  her  own intuitions.xxiv Others  only  believe  that  the  intuitions  of  the  philosophical 
community matter. Still others agree with Miller that good theories will rely upon ‘folk’ 
intuitions shared by all (or at least those not corrupted by too much philosophical theory). 
Philosophers should probably be concerned about the intuitions of different people for 
different  purposes.xxv Some  philosophers  (or  most),  having  thought  about  certain 
philosophical issues, may have better intuitions than the philosophically uninitiated on 
these philosophical topics. It may be obvious to ethicists (but not to others) that accepting 
a  particular  proposition  on  the  basis  of  intuition  will  require  one  to  accept  other 
propositions that have more unintuitive consequences. Ethicists, for instance, may be less 
likely than others to say morality is reducible to the law because they realize that this will  
commit them to the view that slaveholders in the antebellum Southern United States were 
acting morally.  Sometimes,  however, it  is more plausible  that philosophers’ intuitions 
about particular cases have been corrupted by their other theoretical commitments. Those 
who believe that there are only quiddities, for instance, might not think that there are 
individuals who can act well or poorly. What intuitions matter probably also depends a 
bit  on  what  one  is  trying  to  show  and  to  whom.  If  one  is  involved  in  a  purely 
philosophical debate on a particular point appealing to philosopher’s intuitions on that 
point  may be sufficient.  Here we are  involved in  a  much  broader  debate  about  how 
institutions should fulfill need. In the absence of reason to think some people’s intuitions 
matter more than others’ it seems reasonable to appeal to empirical evidence regarding 
folk intuitions here. We must just remain open to revising our results if it turns out that 
some people’s intuitions about meeting need are better than others’.
It is worth considering, then, the experimental evidence Miller cites. In one of 
these  experiments,  ‘subjects  were  asked  to  divide  a  monetary  reward  between  two 
students  who  had  contributed  equally  to  a  common  task;  one  of  the  students  was 
described  as  needing  extra  money  to  buy books  for  a  course.’xxvi The students  were 
described as friendly and like-minded. Some participants suggested that the reward be 
divided equally between the students. Most participants,  however,  wanted to give the 
needy student enough to buy the textbooks before splitting the rest equally.xxvii
Unfortunately, it is hard to see how this experiment shows that people care about 
equality in meeting needs. The evidence seems to support the hypothesis that in some 
situations people will try to help others meet their needs before distributing unnecessary 
goods equally. Had the students needed different amounts, it is not clear how participants 
would  have  distributed  the  reward.  We  need  more  evidence  to  justify  the  kind  of 
connection between need fulfillment and equality that Miller implicitly relies upon. 
Another  experiment  Miller  mentions  tells  us  more.  Miller  reports  Norman 
Frohlich  and  Joe  Oppenheimer’s  experiment  to  imitate  a  Rawlsian  original  position. 
Frohlich and Oppenheimer asked participants  to choose the rules of remuneration for 
work that  participants  then  completed.  Despite  variation  between participants,  people 
generally  choose to  maximize  the average  income level  subject  to a  floor  constraint. 
These preferences were stable over  time.  Because most  people tried to provide a flat 
minimum for everyone, Miller concludes that they disregard  differential need.xxviii Why 
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provide  an  equal  minimal  income  floor  for  individuals  if  people  are  likely  to  need 
different  amounts  of  income?xxix Miller  says  participants  are  balancing  a  concern  for 
giving people their just deserts against a concern for need fulfillment. 
Unfortunately, this explanation is not sufficient. The results just show that people 
are concerned about need, not that ‘people will aim to equalize degrees of unmet need.’xxx 
Miller  never  justifies this  connection  between  need  fulfillment  and  equality  that  he 
implicitly relies upon. One might even make the case that Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s 
experiment shows that most people are not concerned about equality at all. Gillian Brock 
argues, for instance, that this experiment shows that people only care that everyone has 
enough to meet their needs.xxxi
Even if this is wrong, however, it seems that we need more evidence to come to 
any solid  conclusions  about  what  people  care  about  in  meeting  needs.  Perhaps  most 
people  do  accept  Miller’s  principle.  Maybe  most  people  are  completely  egalitarian. 
Maybe they accept some of the simple principles we have rejected.  Maybe they even 
accept the effectiveness principle. Unfortunately, the empirical literature on distributive 
justice is not too helpful in arbitrating between these different theories. One reason for 
this  is  that  the  literature  does  not  address  meeting  needs  in  particular.  Most  of  the 
experimental data focuses on the difference principle. 
To  address  this  problem,  I  designed  a  new  experiment  intended  to  see  what 
principles  appropriately  impartial  people  think  institutions  should  use  for  meeting 
needs.xxxii Participants were asked the question with which this paper started about how to 
distribute vitamins to four people falling below the 20 milligram line. Recall that this was 
the initial situation:
   18 12 6 0
The participants were then asked to rank four possible distributions. Option 1 gave eight 
milligrams to the last person (who originally had zero milligrams and needed 20). This 
was the result of this distribution:
   18 12 6 8
Option 2 gave two milligrams to each person. This was the result:
20 14 8 2
Option 3 embodied  a  roughly utilitarian principle  giving nine milligrams to the third 
person (who had six milligrams and needed 14). This was the result:
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  18 12 15 0
Option 4 embodied a plausible interpretation of the strict priority principle giving seven 
milligrams to the last person (who had zero milligrams and needed 20) and one milligram 
to the third person (who has six milligrams and needed 14). This was the result:
  18 12  7  7
This was the distribution of rankings:
FIGURE 1. Experimental Results
Out  of  33  participants,  12  ranked  the  options  in  the  following  order:  4,  2,  1,  3.  A 
significant number also chose 4, 1, 3, 2.xxxiii Miller would choose 2, 4, 3, 1. Only three 
people  chose  Miller’s  ranking.  This  is  not  a  significantly  different  number  than  the 
number one would expect to choose this ranking if people were picking the rankings 
randomly.xxxiv Obviously, the data do not support Miller’s principle.
The data instead seem to support the strict priority principle. The fact that 12 out 
of 33 chose the ranking 4, 2, 1, 3 is significant.xxxv So, one might wonder whether the data 
does not at the same time undercut the case for the effectiveness principle. This is not so. 
Because the experiment was designed to do many things, it is only capable of telling us 
whether  the  hypothesis  that  people  accept  the  effectiveness  principle  is  falsified.  If 
participants  ranked  Option  1  ahead  of  Option  4  then  they  were  not  accepting  the 
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effectiveness  principle.  After all,  comparing Option 1 and Option 4 one can see that 
Option 1 does not help the least well off (once the 4 th person has more than the 3rd) or 
help as many people as possible. However, 23 out of 31 participants ranked Option 4 
before Option 1 (though some of these people did not choose 4, 2, 1, 3). On average, 
Option 4 is preferred to Option 1.xxxvi 
One might point out that it is hard to falsify the claim that people are accepting 
the effectiveness principle. Only six out of 24 combinations of orderings can falsify the 
claim that people are accepting the principle.xxxvii 
I  actually take this to be a reason to believe that the effectiveness principle is 
strong.  The  effectiveness  principle  has  a  great  deal  of  explanatory  power.  Different 
weightings  on  its  constituent  principles  can  explain  why  people  chose  to  distribute 
necessary goods in different ways. It is hard to falsify the claim that people are accepting 
the effectiveness principle but it is possible. Were there no preference for a version of the 
effectiveness principle we would expect only one-quarter of participants to rank Option 4 
before Option 1,  but about  three quarters of participants  ranked this option first.  The 
claim that most people are accepting the effectiveness principle is plausible.
One  might  counter  that  it  is  hard  to  show  that  people  do  not  accept  the 
effectiveness principle only because the principle is vague. The effectiveness principle 
contains weighted parameters but does not provide the weights; it does not tell us how 
much weight to give to the needs of the least well off or to helping additional people. 
Perhaps there is something to this objection but the effectiveness principle is as 
definite as many other principles about how we should meet needs. Prioritarianism, for 
instance, does not tell us how much weight to assign to its parameters. Prioritarianism 
does not tell us how much weight to give to the needs of the less well off vs. the needs of 
the better off. 
There is certainly room for further experimentation to figure out how most people 
weigh the different parts of the effectiveness principle. Hopefully, however, this paper 
has done enough to motivate this inquiry. Furthermore, we now have enough information 
to  say that  most  people  do  not  accept  Miller’s  principle.  A good principle  for  need 
fulfillment does not have to embody a concern for equality. 
6. CONCLUSION
Many people believe that institutions should help people meet their needs. For those that 
accept  this  conclusion  there  is  a  pressing  question:  How  should  institutions  decide 
between different ways of fulfilling needs in situations where there is no guarantee that 
all  needs can be met  and where no special  obligations  obtain? After considering and 
rejecting  several  simple  principles  for  meeting  need,  this  paper  examined  a  recent 
proposal by David Miller. It argued that the concern for equality embodied in Miller's 
principle was misplaced. Rather, this paper suggested a new  effectiveness  principle for 
fulfilling need. Certainly,  more work is necessary to fully cash out the details  of this 
principle. And, institutions cannot shut their eyes to morally relevant features of the real 
world that might lead them to different conclusions about what to do in different cases. 




APPENDIX I: AVOIDING THE PROBLEMS WITH MILLER’S PRINCIPLE
 
Recall  that  Miller’s  principle  had an  unintuitive  consequence.  It  entailed  that  whose 
needs it is best to meet depends on the number of people in the world who can already 
meet  their  needs.  The  effectiveness  principle  avoids  this  problem.  Suppose  that  the 
weight given to each extra unit of need doubles. Suppose that helping an extra person is 
just as good as removing one extra unit of need. Now consider a case where Tamil has 
one unit of need and  Effe has two units of need. On this version of the effectiveness 
principle, it is twice as good to reduce Effe’s need by one unit as it is to reduce Tamil’s 
need by one unit. Once Effe only needs one unit, it is equally good to help either Effe or 
Tamil. It is better to help both by reducing their need to .5 units each than to reduce the 
need of either alone. 
Consider what this version of the effectiveness principle recommends in the cases 
that caused problems for Miller’s principle. Recall, the initial situation: 
            A B C D E F G
A needs two units to reach the threshold, B-F need one unit to reach the threshold, and G 
can meet her needs. Here is how we calculate the weighted need in this situation using 
this effectiveness principle: Three units of weighted need for A (one for her first unit and 
two for her second unit of need) plus one unit of weighted need for B-F, equals eight 
units of weighted need.
If an institution must either do action one relieving a unit of A’s need or action 
two alleviating a unit of need for each of B-F, it should do action two. If it does action 
one, this is the resulting situation:
            A B C D E F G
A-F are each left with one unit of weighted need so there are six units of weighted need 
total. If it does action two, this is the result:
            A B C D E F G
There are three units of weighted need left. Three units are less than six. So, it is clear 
that action two is better than action one, even before taking into account the fact that 
more people are helped by doing action two. 
This recommendation does not change if the initial situation contains additional 
people H, I, J and K (who are all able to meet their needs):
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    A B C D E  F G H I  J K
Again there are three units of weighted need for A, (one for her first unit and two for her  
second unit of need), plus one for B-F. There are eight units of weighted need total.
If the institution gives one unit to A, this is the situation: 
    A B C D E F G H I  J  K
A-F each have one unit of need left for a total of six units of weighted need. If, instead, 
the institution gives one unit to B-F the result is this: 
     A B C D E FG H  I  J  K
Three units of weighted need remain in this situation. Again, three is less than six. It is 
clear that action two is better than action one even before we take into account the fact 
that more people are helped by doing action two. 
Action two is always required by the effectiveness principle we are considering. 
A  different  way  of  cashing  out  the  principle  might  suggest  doing  action  one  in  all 
situations. But, no matter how it is cashed out, the effectiveness principle avoids Miller’s 
problem. It will never entail that whose needs institutions should meet depends on how 
many people are already able to meet their needs. I leave it to the reader to verify that the 
effectiveness principle also avoids the leveling down objection. 
hassoun@andrew.cmu.edu
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